Kalampedia

A lot has been happening in Afghanistan. USA withdrew its forces along with its NATO allies. Ashraf Ghani, the president (now ex-president) of Afghanistan, escaped the country. The Taliban captured almost all its territory and formed the new regime. The transfer of the power though, as you could tell from the sequence of events, has not been quite pleasant. Now combine that with the presence of terrorist groups along with many tribal warlords (then there is the Northern Alliance), seeking their share in power. All this has led to a fresh turmoil.

None of this is new for the people of Afghanistan. They have got used to this template. One regime, one group of rebels and some foreign country engaging in war to grab power. The characters keep changing but the template remains same. This time the regime is that of the Taliban (about which we learnt here) and the rebel group is the Islamic State and its affiliate group, Islamic State – Khorasan. What is this affiliate group? How did they come about? We will explore these questions in this post with the help of a comprehensive book written on this subject by Antonio Giustozzi: The Islamic State in Khorasan.

To understand the origins of Islamic State – Khorasan, we will have to go back to the year 2014. A number of interesting events took place that year: the fall of northern Iraq to Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, the dramatic gains of this group in Syria, and the proclamation of the ‘Caliphate’. The waves of the emergence of the Islamic State reached well beyond the Middle East to different Muslim communities of the world. Of course, the mass media helped their cause. In the absence of all the glamour that Islamic State showcased through its propaganda, it might not have got the same support from the youth as it did. And the whole glamour had a special impact on the region called Khorasan (historical name) which extends from central to south Asia.

Jihadism in Khorasan region has multiple sources and origins. The Afghan jihad was largely the retaliation of the Taliban Emirate, which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban had been seeking to return to power, or at least force the Afghan government to cede a share of power to them. Eventually, on 15th August this year, they got all of it. Interestingly, there have been many jihadist groups in the region but no other group has ever been in power. The Baluchi jihadists have been fighting against the Islamic Republic of Iran (even Pakistan), the Central Asians have tried to overthrow the regimes of their own countries, Pakistani jihadists groups have different aims, ranging from forcing the establishment of a Sharia regime in Pakistan to fighting abroad, from Afghanistan to Kashmir. All these groups may not have achieved their initial aims, but they all have contributed to the idea of global jihad.

After 2001, the Afghan jihad had become largely central to the world of jihadism in Khorasan, to the extent that almost all these jihadist groups have got involved in it to varying degree. The withdrawal of western combat forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 was widely expected to lead to the successful conclusion of the Afghan jihad (the whole thing got dragged by 7 years). But, here is the interesting point to note. The foot soldiers of these groups, or the jihadists, do not fight to establish a normal-styled government which has good ties with the west. This is exactly what the Taliban is doing right now and this is precisely why these jihadists are looking for more adventurous roles (outside the Taliban). In fact, the reputation of the Taliban as the lead jihadist organisation in the region has been in question for the last few years.

Now, going back a few years, let us see which jihadist groups were operating in the last decade in Khorasan region:

• Lashkar e Taiba (Pakistan)
• Sepah e Sahaba (Pakistan)
• Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan)
• Jaysh e Mohammad (Pakistan)
• Lashkar e Jhangvi (Pakistan)
• Harkat e Mujahidin (Pakistan)
• Jundallah (Iran)
• Harkat ul Ansar Iran (Iran)
• Jaysh al Adl (Iran)
• Harkat e Islami Sistan (Iran)
• Wilayat Khorasan (Iran)
• Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajikistan)
• Jihod Hizbi Nahzati Islami (Tajikistan)
• Harkat e Islami Tajikistan (Tajikistan)
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan)
• Chinese Uyghur Turkestan Islamic Party (China)

Additionally, there are some groups like Al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Union which are international in nature and have several local fronts, and close ties with some of the groups mentioned above. And perhaps it was these groups which contributed the most to the cause of global jihad as we will see.

As the Syrian civil war was dragging on (beginning of 2012) and different insurgent organisations were competing for a greater stake in the campaign against Assad’s regime, the Al Qaeda branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan lobbied their Taliban allies to start sending their volunteers to Syria. In April 2012, the Russian security services were already estimating the presence of 200-250 Afghans and 250-300 Pakistanis of Tehrik e Taliban in Syria. In the next couple of years, hundreds of volunteers flocked from these two countries to fight in Syria. This had essentially become a jihadi export service. These groups were sending jihadis to fight in Syria and were getting big cheques in return. There was good money to be made in the whole arrangement. The volunteers sent by the Haqqani network, for instance, were being paid $800 per month, which was roughly four times what a full-time Taliban fighter was getting at that time in Afghanistan.

As you can see, the Islamic State was beginning to attract Afghans, Pakistanis and Central Asians even before its big military successes of 2014. It provided a perfect ideological ground along with good salaries and therefore gained popularity among Islamic radicals. What followed was even more interesting. The first returnees from Syria also brought the idea of Islamic State’s local branch along with them. Soon people (along with media) discovered first signs of it. In August 2014, a 12-page pamphlet appeared in Pashto and Dari in the frontier areas of Pakistan, announcing the imminent expansion of the Islamic State into ‘Khorasan’. Later that year, there were reports about the existence of a training camp in Kunar, Afghanistan.

The year 2015 brought more news. On 26 January 2015 the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan was announced by Abu Muhammed al Adnani, Islamic State – Central’s spokesperson. From that point onwards, the Islamic State of Khorasan teams visiting the villages identified themselves as Daesh or as Daesh Khorasan, or sometimes Khilafat Islami. Islamic State – Khorasan was authorised to make autonomous decisions about military operations, procurement, salaries, recruitment and budgeting, without having to consult with Islamic State – Central. But the latter had to be involved in any change to laws, rules and regulations, and leadership selection. Most importantly, Islamic State – Central selected the Special Representative who operated as a kind of political commissar making sure that the guidelines and directives were being respected. Islamic State – Central also sent their inspection teams from time to time.

Islamic State – Khorasan chose Afghanistan as the ideal springboard as it was the weakest state in the region with a lot of strategic value. In order to expand and consolidate its presence in Afghanistan, the group adopted a mixed approach: small groups spread around to mostly do recruitment, and a few strongholds where it could build up its army. The result? Read the news about the attack at the Kabul airport. And keep looking for news of any conflict in Afghanistan in future; you will see more of their footprints.